Understanding Religious Decline Using the Concept of Religious Capital

The following is a blog post written with the assistance of the Econ 17 ClassChat chatbot. I uploaded a copy of the Pew Research Center piece and asked the chatbot to write a blog post that used the concept of religious capital to help us understand the patterns in the research study. I then made several edits and revisions to get the final product.

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Headlines about declining religious affiliation worldwide might seem to tell a straightforward story of secularization. However, applying economic analysis—particularly the concept of religious capital—reveals a far more nuanced picture of what's actually happening to religion around the globe.

We see this in a recent piece published by the Pew Research Center. This piece summarizes a recent academic research article that describes how religious decline follows a predictable three-stage pattern called the "Participation-Importance-Belonging" (P-I-B) sequence. First, people participate in worship services less frequently. Second, the importance of religion diminishes in their personal lives. Finally, formal religious belonging becomes less common. This pattern appears across 94 countries and territories studied, suggesting a universal mechanism of religious change.

Religious capital a key concept from economics of religion, refers to the accumulated knowledge, skills, social connections, and cultural familiarity that individuals develop through participation in religious activities. Like financial capital or human capital, religious capital is built through investment (time, effort, participation) and can depreciate without maintenance.

When we view the Pew Research Center's findings through this economic lens, the three-stage decline pattern makes perfect economic sense. People first reduce their investment in building religious capital by attending services less frequently. As their religious capital depreciates, religion becomes less important in their personal lives. Finally, formal religious belonging becomes less valuable as their accumulated religious capital diminishes.

The economic framework helps explain why religious decline isn't universal. In regions like Western Europe and parts of the Americas, several economic factors may be reducing the returns to religious capital investment. Increased opportunity costs mean that as secular alternatives become more attractive and accessible—better entertainment, social services, education—the opportunity cost of time spent in religious activities rises. Government crowd-out occurs when governments provide social safety nets, healthcare, and community services that religious groups traditionally offered, reducing the practical benefits of religious participation. Reduced network effects happen in societies where fewer people participate in religion, decreasing the social benefits of religious capital and creating a self-reinforcing cycle of decline.

Conversely, regions maintaining high religiosity—like parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—often have economic conditions that maintain high returns to religious capital. Religious groups continue to provide essential social services, strong social networks make religious capital more valuable, economic insecurity increases demand for the insurance and support functions religion provides, and government restrictions may actually increase the value of religious identity and community.

Understanding religious decline through an economic lens suggests that simple demographic projections may miss important dynamics. If the economic returns to religious capital change—through shifts in government policy, social conditions, or the competitive landscape—religious participation patterns could shift more rapidly than linear projections suggest.

The global pattern of religious change isn't simply about belief or cultural evolution—it's also about changing economic incentives. Where religious capital provides valuable returns through social networks, services, meaning, and community, religion thrives. Where secular alternatives provide better returns on time and effort invested, religious participation declines.

This economic perspective doesn't diminish the spiritual or cultural significance of religion, but it does help us understand why religious change follows predictable patterns and why one-size-fits-all predictions about secularization often fail. As the global economy continues to evolve, so too will the economic landscape that shapes individual decisions about religious participation and the accumulation of religious capital.

The Rise of Multiple Church Attendance: An Economic Analysis (by the Econ 17 ClassChat Chatbot)

I asked the Econ 17 ClassChat chatbot to write a blog post for me. I gave it this article from the Christian Post on June 18, 2025, about nearly half of American churchgoers attending more than one church, and the provided this prompt:

Consider an economics of religion blog that publishes blog posts for a general audience on current events in the world and how we can understand those blog posts using the economics of religion. Your task is to write a 400-500 word blog post for this economics of religion blog. In this blog post you must use the economics of religion to comment on the news article about churchgoers attending more than one congregation. The goal is to help readers understand how the economics of religion can be used to understand this phenomenon. The blog post should reference Top 10 Economics of Religion Principle 1 in making its presentation. It should also be factually correct and use correct economic reasoning as taught in the course.

Its output was too long, so I asked it to shorten the blog post, giving it some advice on what to cut. The end result is the following blog post.

The Rise of Multiple Church Attendance: An Economic Analysis

A recent study by the Hartford Institute for Religion Research reveals a striking trend: 46% of American churchgoers now attend more than one church regularly. This phenomenon, accelerated by the pandemic's expansion of online worship, offers a fascinating case study in how technological change and market dynamics reshape religious participation patterns. 

Rational Religious Choice in Action 

Top 10 Economics-of-Religion Principle 1 states that "individuals act rationally when making religious choices." The multiple church attendance phenomenon perfectly illustrates this principle while revealing significant changes in the costs and benefits facing religious consumers. 

The Hartford Institute's findings demonstrate how technological innovation has fundamentally altered the economic calculus of religious participation. Previously, attending multiple churches involved substantial costs: additional travel time, scheduling conflicts, and potential social awkwardness from divided loyalties. These high transaction costs effectively limited most people to single-congregation participation. 

However, the pandemic's acceleration of online worship has dramatically reduced these costs. Virtual services eliminate travel time, remove scheduling constraints, and reduce social friction. The 24% of respondents who combine in-person and virtual attendance are leveraging technology to access diverse religious goods while minimizing traditional participation costs. 

From an economic perspective, these churchgoers are maximizing their utility by accessing diverse religious goods and services across multiple providers. One congregation might excel at inspiring worship music, while another offers superior children's programming or community outreach. The reduction in switching costs allows individuals to sample the best offerings from each, much like consumers who shop at different stores to find optimal products for their needs. 

The study reveals that this behavior represents rational portfolio diversification in the religious sphere. Just as financial advisors recommend diversifying investment portfolios to reduce risk, some religious consumers are diversifying their spiritual portfolios to hedge against uncertainty while exploring different theological perspectives and worship styles. 

The Economics of Religious Diversification

This trend reflects classic economic behavior under uncertainty. In a world where religious truth claims are difficult to verify—what economists call "credence goods"—attending multiple churches allows individuals to hedge their bets while exploring different theological perspectives and worship styles. 

The Hartford study's finding that "one in five people who regularly participate elsewhere are doing so with a congregation of a different denomination or faith tradition" suggests that some individuals are engaging in what economists call "religious syncretism"—rationally combining elements from different religious traditions to maximize their spiritual satisfaction. 

Implications for Religious Organizations 

The rise of multiple church attendance presents both opportunities and challenges for religious leaders. While it may reduce the intensity of commitment to any single congregation, it also expands the potential market for religious services. Churches that embrace this trend by offering high-quality, distinctive programming may attract participants from well beyond their traditional geographic boundaries. 

However, this shift also requires rethinking traditional models of religious membership, stewardship, and community building. Religious organizations may need to develop new strategies for fostering commitment and generating the resources necessary for their mission in an environment where loyalty is increasingly divided. 

The Hartford Institute's research reveals that American religious behavior is becoming more sophisticated and market-oriented. Rather than representing a decline in religious commitment, the trend toward multiple church attendance may signal the emergence of more discerning religious consumers who actively seek to maximize the value they receive from their spiritual investments.

The chatbot's focus on Principle 1 is excellent because the pattern of attending multiple churches is definitely something that can be understood as rational decision making. The rise in virtual services dramatically lowered the cost to attending multiple churches, and some simple economic reasoning suggests more people may then want to attend multiple churches. The last section also makes some good points about how the rise of virtual services is an opportunity for religious suppliers to reach new people while also posing challenges for community building.

The weakest part of the blog post is the discussion of risk diversification. Risk diversification can certainly be a motivation for attending multiple churches (as discussed in the MM book), and it may be a motivation in this instance. However, there was only limited evidence in the article that risk diversification was a motivation. Instead, the motivation was primarily driven by limited time, convenience, and a preference for virtual services.

Overall, the Econ 17 ClassChat chatbot wrote a good blog post about an interesting topic of relevance to our class, and with some additional human editing, the blog post would have been even better. AI combined with the human editing is the way to get the blog post.

Is it Ethical to use AI when Writing a Sermon?

Religious leaders speak in church frequently, and it is a lot of work to come up with inspiring and informational sermons so often. Not surprisingly, many religious leaders have started using AI to help them write their sermons. However, as we read in this article from Religious News Service, there is disagreement about the ethics of having an AI write parts or all of a religious leader's sermon. While some believe that AI are an effective tool in the sermon-writing process, others disagree.

The telling story from the article is about Pastor Carriker who, in the midst of a busy week, gave ChatGPT a scriptural reading and some blog posts, and was then surprised at how good of a sermon ChatGPT gave her in 30 seconds. But at the same time, it felt wrong to her.

Most religious denominations do not have clear policies on AI usage in sermons, so religious leaders are left to figure out the appropriate AI usage for themselves. This allows for a wide variety of practices to emerge. As the article explains, a 2024 survey of Protestant clergy found that 12% were comfortable using AI to help write the sermon, while 43% believed AU was useful in doing research and other sermon preparation. Given the feelings people expressed, I would guess that AI usage was underreported, and that actual AI usage in writing sermons is well above 12%.

The critical paragraph is this:

Much of the debate involves grappling with the question of whether AI is being used as a replacement for a sacred human project or whether it’s a tool in the service of that project. 

I predict that the efficiency-improving value of using AI to write sermons will eventually win out, and that the stigma of using AI assistance when writing a sermon will diminish. Clergy will see the value in saving time on sermons, and that will allow them to devote more time to other activities that AI is not equipped to do well.

Whether this leads to an overall improvement in clergy performance is less clear. There is something to be said for laboring through difficult things, and clergy who reduce their time spent grappling with topics for their sermons may find that their capacity to perform their other functions is also diminished even if they have more time for those other activities. But this will be difficult to measure, and in the meantime, the clear benefits of using AI will lead to its increased usage among clergy.

Evidence that Gen Z is Getting More (not Less) Religious

The world is getting less religious, right? You've probably heard this before, and it is true that religiosity has been declining for years in many (but not all) parts of the world. That is why it is always interesting to learn if that trend is continuing or not.

Well, a recent survey from the United Kingdom has found that religiosity actually appears to be increasing with Generation Z. Remember that Gen Z includes those born roughly between 1997 and 2012 (that likely includes you!).

The survey, which was conducted at the end of 2024, found that almost half of 18-24 year-olds in the U.K. report that they "definitely or probably" believe in a God, which is much higher than the reported 29% for people in that age group in 2018.

See this Newsweek article for more details.

Can these new results be explained? Here's a quote from the article:

The question of what motivates the turn toward faith documented in the latest data remains open. Some researchers have pointed to global instability, the isolating effects of digital life and the yearning for meaning in a post-pandemic world as possible drivers. 

Others credit the accessibility of religious content through social media and influencers, some like [Giavanna] Desantis—who has over 220K followers and 4.4M likes on TikTok alone—speak directly to a generation navigating complex identity issues. The creator's own experience illustrates the role personal testimony and online communities can play.

Perhaps a better question is whether these survey results reflect a real change in a long trend in religiosity in the U.K. or whether it is just a temporary blip. What do you think? Are there some experiences that Gen Z has gone through that others have not that will impact their religiosity? Or is this survey evidence signaling a reversal—or at least a stoppage—of declining religiosity in some parts of the world?

Trying to Understand American Religiosity

One of the main lessons that students should take away from this class is that religion is a robust phenomenon, but at the same time religion and religiosity are dynamic and always changing. It is the ability of religious groups to adapt that enables religion to stay robust as other conditions in the world change.

Keep this big picture in mind as you read this RNS article written by Cornell sociologist Landon Schnabel. Scholars of religion are very interested in understanding how American religion has changed how it continues to change. Of course, one of the biggest changes is the large drop in recent decades in the proportion of Americans who report having a religious affiliation.

As Schnabel writes:

We’re witnessing not simple secularization, but transformation and polarization — a sorting process in which those uncomfortable with religious institutions have largely already left, while those who remain are more committed. 

Our new research, based on the National Study of Youth and Religion, reveals that many of those who left, however, aren’t abandoning faith. Instead they’re rejecting religious organizations they find too rigid, judgmental or politicized.

He also offers a helpful interpretation:

This religious transformation we found stems from what we call individualization, a phenomenon in which people increasingly craft their spiritual lives according to personal values, rather than institutional dictates. Once this sorting process reaches a certain point, with most of those experiencing tension between personal values and institutional demands having already departed, the statistical decline naturally levels off.

And his conclusion:

America isn’t becoming less spiritual — it’s becoming differently spiritual.

Read the article in its entirety; it's not that long! As you read, think about the dynamism of religious markets and how religious groups may be able to adapt in the face of this individualization. Can these "differently spiritual" individuals find their way back to affiliation with organized religion? Will changes in their life -- like marriage or parenthood -- bring them back into organized religion? Or will it be adaptations by the religious groups that draw them back? What kinds of adaptations would be able to bring them back?

Is Christianity Still Declining in the U.S.?

In February, the Pew Research Center published some findings from their 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study survey that asks a random sample of Americans many questions about religious participation, family life, religious switching (switching religious groups), and more.

One of the notable findings from their survey is that the percentage of Americans who report a Christian affiliation has held steady in the 2020s after a slow but steady decline in the 2010s. This is an important marker of religiosity in the U.S. because Christianity has always been the most prominent religious tradition in the U.S.

Meanwhile, the percentage of Americans who report no religious affiliation--called the "Nones"-- has also remained about the same in the last few years after a slow but steady increase.

Go to the webpage for their report here. and skim their summary of the findings.

It will take years before researchers can determine if a temporary trend or if this reflects a kind of stabilization in American religiosity, but there are some indications that the stabilization is real. For example, during the 2020s the percentage of Americans who say that they pray daily has been steady at about 44-46%, and the percentage of Americans who say that they attend church monthly has also been steady in the low 30s.

At the same time, there are some indications that American religiosity will continue to decline by some measures. Younger Americans are less likely to identify as religious or as Christian than older Americans.

What do you think about these trends? Do you think religion has stabilized in the U.S.? Or do you think that this is a temporary pause from an otherwise long-run decrease in American religious? Or do you think the opposite, i.e., that American religiosity has come close to its low point and that it will eventually go back up?

What reasons can you give to support your stance?

Religious Publishing in the U.S.

The world of religion has competition at many margins. The most recent post on this blog was about how religious activities compete with other activities for people's time. This post is about a recent opinion piece at Religion News Service about competition in the religious publishing industry in the U.S. The author is Anna Piela, an American Baptist Church minister and scholar.

As the article explains, religious publishing has a long history in the U.S. The first Bible printed in the U.S. was actually a translation into a Native American language in 1663! Christian publishing grew tremendously in the latter part of the 20th century, and even though it has declined in recent decades, it is still an $820 million/year industry.

Religious books are published by large publishing companies but also--and this is what makes religious publishing unique--by religious denominations themselves. Denominational publishing houses print religious materials for religious instruction, music, and other topics and, depending on the denomination, provide for free or sell them to congregations or to church members directly. Having printed materials is vital for religious groups because they are a key tool in the promotion of religious teachings among children and youth and for proselytizing.

But it seems that the rise of Amazon has brought new challenges for the publishing industry. For example, Amazon has made it more difficult for brick-and-mortar bookstores to succeed. That reduces opportunities for religious groups to advertise and promote their books, not just because secular bookstores with a little space for religious book have closed but also because many religiously-themed bookstores have also closed.

Read the article to see other challenges faced by religious publishers identified by the author.

Religious publishers will need to find ways to adapt so that they can stay competitive, but do not doubt that they will. Religious groups in a competitive setting like the U.S. have always needed to adapt to stay competitive, so that is not new.

Religion and the Allocation of Time in America

Every year the U.S. Census Bureau conducts a national survey, called the American Time Use Survey, in which they collect data on how people spend their time throughout the day. It is an important survey for researchers in economics and other social sciences because its unique data allows them to study a large variety of research questions.

The most recent Time Use Survey (2023) reveals some interesting facts. For example, on average Americans spend:

• 9.84 hours/day on personal care and sleep.
• 1.20 hours/day and drinking.
• 1.92 hours/day doing household activities.
• 0.66 hours/day shopping.

You can see some summary charts here, but more better details are in some published tables here. It is there that you can get specific information about time spent in religious activities.

The civilian population 15 years and older spend, on average, about 0.11 hours/day on "religious activities." That is about 6.6 minutes per day. About 60% of that time is spent "attending religious services," and the other 40% is spent "participating in religious practices."

The average time spent on religious activities per day is higher for women (0.14 hours) than men (0.09 hours), which is consistent with the standard finding that women are more religious than men in the U.S.

Though of course there is some variance across people with some spending a lot of time and others spending no time on religious activities. For those who participate in religious activities, the average amount of time spent in religious activities is 1.50 hours/day.

Here's a table with a few comparisons:

Activity	Avg hrs/day, entire population	Avg hrs/day, participants only
Religious and spiritual activities	0.11	1.50
Volunteering	0.10	2.11
Socializing and communicating	0.57	1.96
Relaxing and leisure	4.00 (TV= 2.67)	4.51 (TV = 3.62)
Sports, exercise, and recreation	0.34	1.57
Telephone (calls, mail, email)	0.16	0.90

On the surface, the numbers for religious and spiritual activities seem small compared to the other non-work, not-sleep categories in the table. But keep in mind that a lot volunteering may be religiously-motivated or organized through religious groups, some time spent socializing or playing sports may be with members of one's congregation, and communication may also be with other religious group members. So even if time spent on direct religious practice seems small, there are many activities that have a religious dimension even if not labelled as such in the survey.

Nonetheless, there are a lot of activities that vie for people's limited time, and religious groups are always competing not just with other religious groups but also the many other non-religious "distractions" in life. In fact, it might be the little decisions about religion that people face every day that really determine the value and impact of religion in their lives.

Here are some questions for you to think about:

• Which non-religious activities pose the largest threats to religious activities?
• How do you think the cost and benefits of these non-religious activities has changed in recent years?
• How do you think the answer to the above question might depend on your age?

Resolution of a Long-standing Conflict in the United Methodist Church

For the last several years, the United Methodist Church (UMC) has been dealing with internal divisions over several matters of church policy, particularly on issues related to same-sex marriage and gay clergy. Resolving the internal conflict was delayed due the COVID-19 pandemic, but a process was put in place for congregations dissatisfied with the removal of restrictions against same-sex marriage and gay clergy to officially leave the church. During the last three years, a quarter of the UMC's congregations left the denomination, some joining a new denomination (the Global Methodist Church), some joining other Methodist denominations, and some staying independent. This resulted in a dramatic loss in the number of members in the UMC during the last few years, and it contributed to decades-long trend in UMC membership decline.

With the departures of those who opposed same-sex marriage and gay clergy, the remaining individuals and leaders faced little opposition to make official changes to church policy, and these changes were officially voted in earlier this month at their General Conference. (see here and here). This resolves a long-standing conflict in the UMC that has been touched on in several posts on this blog since 2020 (see here, here, here, and here).

This latest development was expected because so many of its opponents had left and were no longer present to prevent it, but it is still a historic development for the UMC. The removal of restrictions against same-sex marriage and gay clergy was hailed as a giant victory by some in the church but criticized as the most recent instance of straying farther from scriptural guidance for others. But whichever side of the issue a person finds themselves, it was a big change for what was once one of the largest denominations in the U.S.A.

This change is a clear reduction in the strictness of the UMC, and our economic approach predicts that this change will not help the UMC to reverse it long-run membership decline. Removing restrictions against same-sex marriage and gay clergy removes one of the remaining differences between the UMC and other mainline denominations that had already made similar accommodations. AS a result, the UMC is as similar to the other mainline denominations than it has ever been in its history, and that means that it will be more difficult than before to convince potential members of the UMC's uniqueness and value.

People inside and out of the UMC can debate whether the development was right or wrong, and that is a matter for which our economic approach cannot directly help. However, our economic approach does suggest that it will now be more difficult than ever for the UMC to claim any advantages over other mainline churches when competing for members. We should expect that the UMC's membership decline will continue apace and that what was once one of the largest denominations in the U.S.A. will not regain its once-dominant position in the American religious marketplace.

"None" but Not "Atheist"

The percent of the American population that reports no religious affiliation has increased dramatically over the last few decades--from about 5% to almost 30% today. These individuals, who are referred to as the "nones" because they select "none" on surveys when asked for their religious affiliation, now outnumber the Catholics in the U.S.A., which is America's largest denomination.

But who are the nones? And exactly how religious are they?

This has been the topic of a lot of research in recent years, and this article on Religion Unplugged provides an excellent look at why the increase in Nones has not meant an increase in atheism.

As you read this article, ask yourself:

• What is the difference between being a none and being an atheist?
• What are the characteristics of nones, and how do those differ from atheists?
• What people are likely to become nones, and which people are more likely to become atheists?
• What might it take for the people who are nones today to switch into something other than none in the future?

COVID-19, Religion, and Survey Responses

Many studies have provided evidence that religious participation declined during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, a recent article published in Sociology of Religion (one of the leading journals that publishes social-scientific research on religion) shows that the purported decline may be due to a change in survey collection and not a change in religiosity.

The article is too long to read in its entirety, but you can skim it at the link above (use a computer from on campus or use the UCI VPN to access it). 

The gist of the paper is as follows. The General Social Survey (GSS), which is the most frequently used survey in religion research, changed its collection method during the pandemic from face-to-face interviews to online. This change in mode of data collection resulted unintentionally in a change in the types of people who agreed to participate in the survey. In particular, highly religious persons were less likely to participate in the new online format, and this resulted in a decline in the measured religious participation in the data from before the pandemic.

This finding teaches us an important specific lesson about research on religion and how we must always be cautious about the sources of data that we use. Researchers must strive to be aware of changes in the method of data collection when comparing different datasets.

It also tells us something important about American religion, namely, that American religion did not decline in the way that many people thought it did during the COVID-19 pandemic. In hindsight, it might not be surprising that religion did not decline as some researchers had concluded because people often turn to religion during difficult times. This paper provides the evidence to support the hunch.

Finally, it provides an important cautionary tale to future researchers who want to design religion surveys. Every survey mode has pros and cons, and it is important to be aware of those pros and cons when designing your survey.

Religion and Happiness

Empirical results from social-scientific data analysis are always under scrutiny, but there is one pattern that is so well established that it appears to be beyond dispute. That pattern is the strong and robust positive relationship between religion and happiness. A recent article in the Deseret News provides a very accessible summary of some of the findings.

Read this article, and as you read you should ask yourself a variety of questions.

• Why are religious people happier?
• Is there a causal relationship between religion and happiness so that religion actually makes people happier?
• Are all religious people happy? Why or why not?
• If religion does make people happier, then does mean that religion is overall good for society?

A Continuing Trend in Government Restrictions on Religion

Last month, the Pew Research Center released a report on changes in government restrictions on religion around the world. Read the summary here. If you are interested, then you can also check out the full report pdf, but be warned that it is pretty long.

The key finding is that the median level of government restrictions on religion increased slightly from 2020 to 2021. This development is a continuation of a trend that the Pew Research Center has been measuring since 2007 using their Government Restrictions Index (GRI).

In statistics, an index is a composite statistic. That is, it is a single number that summarizes information from several data sources.. Creating an index is no simple thing because it can be conceptually difficult to determine how best to combine different data into a single number, but indices are very important in the social sciences because of their ability to summarize many things at once. And this is true for the GRI. Because government restrictions can take many forms, the GRI provides a single number that summarizes all of those government restrictions in a useful way.

As you read this summary, you should look for information on the GRI, what it measures, and how it measures it. Also look for information about how government restrictions are related to other types of government interventions, such as the government's providing of benefits to religious groups.

Once you've read the summary page, then click on the link that takes you to Chapter 4 to learn about restrictions in the world's 25 most populous countries. Scroll down to see the graphic. Which large countries have the most restrictions? Which large countries have the fewest restrictions? Any surprises?

Recent Articles about Religious Competition

In an article in the Salt Lake Tribune, we read about what happens to empty church buildings no longer being used by congregations.  Some buildings are repurposed, some are razed, and some have various parts salvaged.

An article in The Atlantic describes some of the ways that Catholicism has adapted over the last couple centuries.  While it had "dogmatically opposed modernity" at times, it has also found an active public profile.

Finally, an article at NPR discusses some ways that churches are experimenting with alternative ways to engage with people.  Think gardening!

USCIRF Report on State-favored Religions

Last week the USCIRF (which you will learn about on Homework 7) issued a report on state-favored religions.  Here's the press release, and here is the entire report (pdf).

Some of the key points include:

• 73% of the 78 countries that have an official or favored religion, also have policies or laws that led to repression or discrimination.
• Religious minorities and women are among the mostly likely victims of this repression and discrimination.

The report is only 8 pages, so read the entire report.  Ask yourself the following questions as you read:

• Of the 78 countries with an official or favored religion, in how many is Islam the favored religion?  What about Christianity?  What other religions may be favored?
• In what parts of the world are countries with favored religions located?  Where are the ones that have discriminatory laws and policies?  Where are the ones that do not have discriminatory policies?
• Do you see any patterns?
• What types of repression and discrimination occur?
• What is the connection between having a favored religion and having discriminatory laws and policies?
• Are non-religious persons also victims?  Why or why not?

Which is Better: Conducting the Survey Online or Over the Phone?

A recent article at Religion News Service describes a new study of survey responses for the General Social Survey (GSS).  This study finds that the move from conducting the GSS via phone calls to conducting surveys online has led to a change in the set of people to agree to participate in the survey, and that this can lead to mistakes in how we interpret trends in the data.  In particular, the study finds that highly religious individuals are less likely to participate in the online surveys, and that this skews the survey results so that the surveys overstate the decline in religiosity.

There is a counterargument, however, that is also mentioned in the RNS article, namely, that the phone interviews were already overstating American religiosity so the move to online survey is producing more representative data.

This debate illustrates how, even when two people agree on what the data literally report, they may still disagree on the best way to interpret what the data actually mean.

The Costs and Benefits for Different Kinds of Religiosity

Chapter 4.2 of the book of the text discusses the relative importance or "nature" and "nurture."  According to studies, both nature and nurture influence religiosity, but the relative importance of each differs by the type of religiosity.  In particular, religious affiliation tends to be more stable and influenced by one's parents throughout one's life than church attendance.

Consider one way this pattern is manifested. Suppose an individual grows up in a religious household, takes upon themselves the religious identification of their parents, and is a regular participant in the activities of their parents' religious group throughout their childhood.  As they advance through adulthood, their interest in religion declines.  Although they continue to maintain their identification with the same religious group. they rarely participate in church activities.  That is, they originally inherited the "belonging" and "behaving" of their parents as a child but now have an adult have only retained the "belonging."

Why would this pattern come to realization?  Some simple cost-benefit analysis of an example can provide a clue.

First consider the affiliation decision.  There are probably some benefits to an individual to retaining their religious affiliation, while there is little benefit to switching.  By keeping their identification, they keep their parents happy to an extent.  They can also attend church with their parents on major holidays, thereby maintaining some family cohesion.  But it is also the case that keeping the religious identification does not involve any costly action.  Although it will differ across individuals, retaining their identification can involve as little as periodic verbal acknowledgement of their affiliation in conversation.  So even if there are relatively few benefits for retaining the affiliation, having a little cost to retaining the affiliation means that a person can retain their inherited affiliation for a long period of time without much pressure to change.

The church-attendance decision is quite different.  Attending in any given week involves clear costs because the time spent at church can be spent on so many other activities -- sleeping, exercising, studying, earning money, practicing a hobby, enjoying time with friends, streaming a movie online, and so on.  Time-allocation decisions are frequent and regular with pretty clear costs.  So even though the decision to attend any particular week might seem to be a less significant decision than the decision of one's religious affiliation, the fact that there are clear and obvious costs to attending church means that the decline in religious participation may occur more steadily with a decline in religious demand and long before a change -- if any -- in religious affiliation.

This simple analysis illustrates one of the reasons why religiosity is complex, namely, that the costs and benefits of different types of religiosity can change in different ways, and this can result in different trends in those different types of religiosity even for the same individual.

Burkinis in the Public Swimming Pool

In June of this year, an administrative court in France upheld a ruling that women are not allowed to wear burkini swimwear in public swimming pools in the city of Grenoble.  The burkini is a head-to-ankle swimsuit that covers the woman's entire body except for her face.  Responding to vocal locals, city leaders had previously determined the burkinis would be allowed, but then a higher-ranking government official (the prefect) stopped this decision.  The administrative court upheld the prefect's decision that burkinis not be allowed.

See this article.  The primary direct effect of this ruling is that many Muslim women will no longer be swimming in the pool because they would only swim there if they could wear burkinis.

Some other French cities do allow burkinis in their public pools, so it might seem strange to not allow them in Grenoble's pools.  The court's reasoning behind not allowing them in Grenoble is not that burkinis should be prohibited in general but rather that the Grenoble city leaders whose decision -- later overturned -- to allow women to wear burkinis in public pools made their decision based in part of religious reasons, which violates a principle of separation of church and state.  Those cities that allow burkinis in public pools made their decisions to allow burkinis as part of general loosening of swimwear restrictions and not specifically to satisfy a particular religious demand.

The article does not make any prediction about what will happen next, however the ruling does seem to leave open a path for burkinis to be allowed in Grenoble in the future.  The key is for the burkini proponents to advocate for a more general loosening of swimwear restrictions rather than a specific burkini privilege.  Whatever happens, this case demonstrates the intricate interplay between religious persons and government officials that leads to the religious rules and regulations that we observe in the real world.

The Future of American Religion

The Pew Research Center published a new report titled Modeling the Future of Religion in America (full pdf here).  The main idea is to make projections of religious affiliation rates going forward fifty years.  Making projections is a tricky sort of business because it is all about identifying which of the current trends will continue, which will not, and what not-yet-experienced trends may occur.

This report proceed by considering a few different levels of switching out of Christianity.  With no switching, Christianity remains the majority religious tradition by affiliation in 2070, but with other switching scenarios, Christianity loses its majority status by 2070.

The report also discusses some of the nuts and bolts underlying the projections.  For example, the projections need to make various assumptions about not just rates of religious disaffiliation, but also about fertility, mortality, migration, and intergenerational religious transmission.

With so many moving parts, it is impossible to get everything correct, but making a perfect projection is too high of a standard.  What this report can do -- and does pretty well in my opinion -- is provide a limited number of plausible future scenarios.

Millennials and Digital Worship

According to this article at RNS, a recent research study found that 32% of American and Canadian millennials consume religion digitally but only 5% said they consume digitally without also participating in person. The millennials are an interesting population because they grew up before smart phones.

The author of this research study, sociologist Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme, left it up to the respondents to define digital religion themselves.  Here are a few quotes from her:

"For the most part, people are both involved in person and supplement that through digital religion."

"There are a lot of savvy religious users using it to complement existing ties (to religion)."

"The overall takeaway for me was that digital religion is definitely a thing, but it's a thing that only a chuck of the (millennial) population does."

These findings match what we have discussed in class previously, namely that online and digital resources tend to supplement other existing forms of religion rather than displace them.  As children who grew up with smart phones enter adulthood, new studies will be needed to see if they manifest the same pattern.