Has the Percentage of Religious Nones in the USA Plateaued?

One of the most important trends in American religion over the past few decades is the rise of the "religious nones" — people who report "none" as their religious affiliation. Nones are not a single group. They include committed atheists and agnostics, but also many people who pray, believe in God, or even attend services occasionally, yet simply don't report an affiliation.

As reported by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) in April 2026, this trend of increasing nones may not be continuing. According to their 2025 Census of American Religion:

[T]he percentage of religiously unaffiliated in America has plateaued: In 2025, 28% of Americans identify as having no religious tradition, similar to the previous year’s rate.

It will be several years before we know whether 2025 marks a genuine plateau or just a pause in a longer trend. But it's worth asking, in the meantime: if the nones really have hit their ceiling, why would that ceiling be where it is?

Before getting to that question, one nuance is worth flagging. The 28% figure is a national average, and averages can stay flat while the parts that make up the overall average move in opposite directions. PRRI's own data show this. Disaffiliation among young men (ages 18–29) has been essentially flat for over a decade, holding around 35% since 2013, but for young women the disaffiliation rate has continued to climb from 29% unaffiliated in 2013 to 43% in 2025. That's a useful reminder: a stable aggregate does not necessarily mean a stable equilibrium. It can also mean that offsetting forces are canceling out in the topline number.

In principle, 100% of Americans could become nones, but there are good reasons to believe that the percentage of nones should converge to a level well below 100%. It helps to frame these as demand-side reasons and supply-side reasons.

Consider first the demand side. Many people find real meaning in secular ideals, but for many others, the goods that religion provides do not have a close secular substitute. Religious traditions offer claims about an afterlife, a relationship with the divine, and a moral community organized around those claims. Meanwhile, secular alternatives simply do not attempt to replicate this package in a close way. An economist would way that religion is a distinct and differentiated good with few close substitutes. Demand for it can shrink at the margin, but it's unlikely to be competed away out of the market entirely because nothing else on the market does quite what it does.

Now consider the supply side. People who end their religious affiliation do not necessarily leave religion forever. Many leave because they are dissatisfied with the specific options available to them, not because they've rejected the underlying product. That means the size of the "leaving" pool responds to how well religious organizations innovate, adapt, and improve what they offer rather than just watching people go. This adjustment is not automatic: many mainline Protestant denominations have kept losing members for decades despite (or because of) efforts to modernize. But other strict groups have held their share, and some, like megachurches, have grown even as the nones have grown alongside them.

Put together, the demand-side story explains why there should be a "none plateau" below 100%, while the supply-side story helps to determine exactly where that plateau might be at a particular time and place.

If the supply-side story has real force, we should be able to see it in the data over time: denominations and congregations that adapt fastest in worship style, community offerings, or missionary outreach should be the ones that hold or grow their share, even while the national plateau holds steady overall. That's a testable claim, and one worth returning to as more data come in over the next decade. Indeed, whether the 28% figure holds or resumes its climb is an interesting question, but perhaps the more interesting question is which organizations are gaining and losing share underneath it, and why.

Latest Megachurch Developments

Several Protestant denominations have been shrinking for decades. This includes many mainline denominations such as the Episcopalian Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the United Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church U.S.A., and the United Church of Christ. It also includes some large, stricter denominations like the Southern Baptist Convention.

Working against this trend is the relative success of megachurches (congregations with more than 2000+ in weekly attendance), with a larger share of Protestant churchgoers participating in megachurches instead of smaller and more traditional congregations.

The latest developments in this trend are reported in the latest megachurch report put out by the Hartford Institute for Religion Research:

Megachurch Resurgence: How Big-Attendance Churches Rebounded After the Pandemic

The report is long, and you do not have to read it carefully in its entirety. But you should skim through parts of it to get a good sense of the findings. Remember: the trend of more Americans participating in religion via megachurches is one of the biggest developments in American religion of the last couple decades.

Quoting from the press release, the main findings are:

• "Two-thirds (67%) of megachurches now exceed their pre-pandemic attendance, while 84% report their congregation is stronger today than before COVID.
• "Eighty-six percent describe themselves as thriving and optimistic about their future.
• "Financial health has improved significantly, with giving increasing faster than both inflation and attendance.
• "Racial diversity continues to grow, with 66% of megachurches now qualifying as multiracial, compared to 56% five years ago.
• "Community engagement remains central, with nearly nine in ten churches actively serving their surrounding communities and most opening their facilities for nonprofit, educational, civic, or community use.
• "Leadership development has become increasingly intentional, as more than three-quarters operate ministry residency or leadership development programs."

We should not overstate the religious success of megachurches. For example, fewer people are attending church weekly in most denominations. In particular, megachurches have seen a large decline in the number of members who attend weekly, as many people shift to monthly attendance instead of weekly attendance. Nonetheless, the continued relative success of megachurches is one of the most important developments in American religion of the last few decades.

Will AI Impact the Hiring of Clergy in the United States?

Artificial intelligence (AI) is changing the workplace, and one of the big concerns that many people have is whether or not AI will be adopted in ways that reduce the number of people hired into certain jobs. People have speculated about different kinds of jobs that are especially at risk (e.g., paralegals), but hardly any attention has been paid to whether or not AI will impact the hiring of clergy.

So, will AI eventually replace clergy?

I think that the best answer to that question is: probably not much, at least anytime soon.

Economists often distinguish between tasks and jobs. AI is excellent at certain tasks, particularly those involving the production and organization of information. Having AI undertake these kinds of tasks can be very useful to clergy. In fact, there is already evidence that clergy are already using AI in significant ways. In one recent study, only 13% of clergy respondents claimed to not use it at all. Those that use AI report employing it to do biblical research, graphic design, and other organizational tasks. In fact, the share of clergy using AI to assist with sermon preparation has doubled in the last two years, so it is clear that there are some real productivity gains to be realized by clergy using AI.

Yet, the job of clergy involves much more than producing sermons. Clergy counsel families during times of grief, comfort the sick in hospitals, perform weddings and funerals, mentor young people, resolve conflicts within congregations, and provide spiritual leadership. These responsibilities depend on personal relationships, emotional intelligence, and credibility. In other words, the most effective clergy are people whom members know and trust, and AI cannot easily replace the human relationships that are central to religious leadership. From an economic perspective, AI appears more likely to complement clergy rather than substitute for them.

This is not to say that all jobs within religious organizations are safe. Many congregations employ administrative and support staff whose routine tasks are more susceptible to automation. Part-time staff may find their jobs more easily replaced, especially in small or shrinking congregations where budgets are very tight.

However, these changes are more likely to alter how religious organizations conduct their business rather than eliminate the need for clergy. For now, AI is more likely to change how clergy spend their time than to reduce the number of clergy who are hired. If anything, AI may allow pastors, priests, rabbis, and other religious leaders to devote even more attention to the people-centered work that only human beings can effectively provide.

Rise in Social Hostilities Involving Religion Around the World

The Pew Research Center has been tracking and measuring the regulation of religion around the world for almost two decades now, and earlier this month they released their latest update.

The headline is that from 2022 to 2023 there was a sizeable increase in social hostilities involving religion around the world (notice that there is a lag in the release of their data, which is why they are reporting on 2023). The full pdf report is here, but you can read the detailed summary here.

The report shows updates to their two indices: the Social Hostilities Index and the Government Restrictions Index. According to the former, the number of countries that were classified as having a "High" or "Very High" level of social hostilities increased from 45 (out of 198 countries) in 2022 to 55 in 2023. The median classification did not change, which means that the increase in hostility happened in countries that already have been having higher-than-average levels of social hostility.

You do not need to read the full report, but definitely read the entire detailed summary linked above. This will give you a brief but good introduction to the kinds of hostilities and regulations that religious people around the world face. Then, after reading the detailed summary, you can check out the full report if you are interested.

By the time you are done reading, you should:

• Understand the difference between the Social Hostilities Index (SHI) and the Government Restrictions Indices (GRI).
• Know the trends in both indices since 2007.
• Know of the types of regulation and hostilities that have been experienced in several countries.

Later in the course you will learn much more about how religious practice is hindered around the world.

The End of Germany's Surveillance of Scientologists

Germany has engaged in surveillance of the Church of Scientology since for the past 30 years, but that surveillance came to an end in May 2026. See the report on the Religion Clause website. You can also see the report from the Church of Scientology here.

The surveillance began in the 1990s after the Berlin Wall fell and East and West Germany were reunified. This was a tumultuous time, and people with political power were open to hearing accusations that certain groups of people or institutions--like the Church of Scientology--were a threat to the new country. This surveillance continued for three decades despite no clear evidence to support the accusations that Scientologists worked to undermine the German constitution. During the 30 years of surveillance, Scientologists gained new protections (or at least a lessoning of targeted discrimination) in many countries. It just took Germany much longer than the others to admit that Scientologists were not the threat like detractors of the group claimed them to be.

Though perhaps it is too much to say that the German government "admitted" that Scientologists were not a threat. Interestingly, the German government did not actually acknowledge that their surveillance efforts were misguided. Instead, they explained that other matters are more deserving of their limited resources. In effect, the German government is claiming to use a cost-benefit analysis and now calculated that the opportunity cost of continuing the surveillance had become too high. This leaves open the theoretical possibility that the surveillance may be reinstated in the future if the cost-benefit analysis changes, but it seems unlikely. With very little to show from their efforts over 30 years, the lack of an admission of wasted effort seems more like a way for the government to save some face rather than a strong stance against Scientology.

To be clear, I am not endorsing Scientology. Instead, I am merely raising your awareness of the kinds of legal discrimination that happens against minority religious groups. Having religious freedom in a country means that even "unfamiliar," "different," or "strange" religious groups have their rights protected just as much as long-established religious groups. Religious freedom continues to be a negotiated matter for many religious groups in many countries."

Gabi the AI Monk

On Wednesday, May 6, 2026, a four-foot-tall, humanoid robot named Gabi went through a special ordination to become what may be the world's first robotic monk. See this article at the Smithsonian Magazine. The ceremony, which was held at the (Buddhist) Jogyesa Temple in Seoul, South Korea, was adapted with Gabi's robotic nature in mind, with special vows to save energy by not overcharging and to not harm other robots.

You can see clips of the ordination ceremony here on YouTube.

The obvious context for this development is the adoption of AI and AI-related tools in more and more of our everyday lives. That AI spills over into religious life is not surprising at all, as has been noted here on this blog in many past blog posts (just scroll down in past months and you will see them). In fact, as mentioned in the article, there are also a small number of known cases of robots actively participating in religious rituals, providing religious instruction, performing spiritual care, or actively preaching. However, the ordination of a robotic monk seems to be a new step with some symbolic meaning. I hope we learn more about what functions Gabi will actually fulfill for the temple, and perhaps some of them will be more than perfunctory.

Other relevant context for this development context, which is noted in the article, is that Buddhism is the only major religious tradition that is losing followers worldwide (see this Pew Research article). I do not expect that the incorporation of robots into temple activities will not reverse this trend, but perhaps ift can still help Buddhist temples by lowering some of their operational costs.

That said, given the increased frequency of interactions with AI in many countries, I do expect that robots and other AI tools will find increasing use in religion worldwide. Although most religious practitioners will still prefer human interaction, the number who prefer an AI-mediated interaction with their religious group can only go up. And as AI technology improves, do not be surprised when more religious groups find ways to incorporate AI technology--be it robots or something else--when providing religious services. Some religious groups are always among the earliest adopters of new technologies when they believe that the new technology can help them in their religious missions.

And if you are worried that Gabi may feel alone as the only robotic monk at the Jogyesa Temple, then have no fear: the temple has already incorporated other robots into some of their activities.

2026 USCIRF Annual Report

The USCIRF released its 2026 report last week. Read the read the press release here, and find the full pdf of the report on their Annual Reports page.

This year's report classified 18 countries as Countries of Particular Concern:

• Afghanistan
• Burma
• China
• Cuba
• Eritrea
• India
• Iran
• Libya
• Nicaragua
• Nigeria
• North Korea
• Pakistan
• Russia
• Saudi Arabia
• Syria
• Tajikistan
• Turkmenistan
• Vietnam

This list includes all 16 countries classified as CPCs in the 2025 report, but further adds Libya and Syria.

Religious Minorities in Iran

The death of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, following the attacks by the U.S. and Israel has created profound uncertainty for the country's religious minorities. It also provides us in this class with a real-world case study in how government regulation shapes religious markets and the survival of minority religious groups.

Iran maintains a highly regulated religious market. Unlike the United States, where low barriers to entry allow diverse religious groups to compete freely, Iran maintains an official state religion with extreme government favoritism. The theocratic regime doesn't just prefer Shia Islam; it actively suppresses religious competitors through systematic persecution, property confiscation, and exclusion from education and employment.

This RNS article reveals the stark reality of this regulation and its effects on religious minorities. One of those groups are the followers of the Baha'i religion. Bahaʼis are systematically excluded from higher education and have their businesses shuttered, and crackdowns have intensified following the Israel-Iran conflict. These actions create a large barrier to entry for Baha'is because legal and social obstacles prevent religious entrepreneurs from starting new groups or minority religions from operating freely.

Yet, somehow, religious minorities can find ways to survive in such hostile regulatory environments. The article notes that Iran's religious minorities, particularly the 300,000 Bahaʼís, continue to exist despite decades of systematic oppression. This persistence relies in part on their ability to produce the club goods that comprise part of their religious communities. This includes the shared benefits of belonging—spiritual support, social networks, cultural identity—that create strong incentives for members to maintain their affiliation even when the costs are extremely high.

At the same time, economic theory also predicts that the intense regulation suppresses religious pluralism, and if the official state church fails to meet religious consumers' needs, then religious vitality can also decline. Indeed, the article notes growing secularization among Iran's Muslim majority, with surveys showing over 45% of respondents identifying as having no faith by 2020. This suggests that excessive religious regulation can backfire, reducing not just minority religions but overall religiosity in society.

As Iran faces this leadership transition, the fate of its religious minorities will depend largely on whether the new regime maintains the current highly regulated religious market or allows greater religious competition. For students of this class, Iran's situation demonstrates how government policies don't just shape political outcomes; they fundamentally determine whether diverse religious communities can survive and thrive.

(This article was written with the help of the Econ 17 ClassChat Chatbot.)